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WORKER REPRESENTATION AND SOCIAL DIALOGUE AT THE  
WORK PLACE LEVEL IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Charles B. Craver, U.S. Reporter 
Freda Alverson Professor of Law 
George Washington University 
 
 [W]e must have democracy in industry as well as in government; . . . democracy 
 in industry means fair participation by those who work in the decisions vitally 
 affecting their lives and livelihood; and . . . the workers in our great . . . industries 
 can enjoy this participation only if allowed to organize and bargain collectively 
 through representatives of their own choosing.1 
 
 Approaching the twenty-first century, the United States effectively stands alone  
 among the developed nations, on the verge of having no effective system of 
 worker representation and consultation. . . . Survey data indicate that some 30 to 
 40 million American workers without union representation desire such 
 representation, and some 80 million workers, many of whom do not approve of 
 unions, desire some independent collective voice in their workplace.2 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Individual workers in the United States possess minimal employment rights 
compared to other advanced nations. Almost all are employed on an at-will basis, which 
means that they can be terminated at any time for almost any reason.3 Private sector 
employees enjoy no constitutional rights vis-à-vis their employers due to the absence of  
government involvement.4 The primary exceptions to this rule are provided by civil 
                                                 
1 Senator Robert Wagner, Radio Speech (April 12, 1937), in Supreme Court Finding Hailed by Wagner as 
Most Significant Since Marshall, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1937, at 20. 
 
2 Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck, Workplace Representation Overseas: The Works Councils Story, in 
WORKING UNDER DIFFERENT RULES 97, 98 (Richard B. Freeman, ed., 1994). 
 
3 See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, CHARLES B. CRAVER, ELINOR P. SCHROEDER & ELAINE W. 
SHOBEN, EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.1 (3d ed.  2004). 
 
4 Although Americans enjoy freedom of speech under the First Amendment to  the U.S. Constitution, they 
are only protected against retaliatory state action, not private action. Even public employees enjoy only 
limited free speech rights. While their governmental employers may not retaliate against them because they 
have spoken out as private citizens concerning issues of public concern, when they make statements in 
connection with their official employment duties, they do not enjoy First Amendment protection. See 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1917528
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rights laws that prohibit discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, national 
origin,5 age,6 or disability.7 Most state courts also preclude terminations that would 
contravene a significant public policy, such as the right to serve on a jury or to refuse
falsify a government-required report.
 to 
, 
st 
ent 
enjoy 
iate 
                                                                                                                                                
8 They enjoy no protection against unjust dismissals
unless they are covered by bargaining agreements that have been negotiated by 
representative labor organizations. They may similarly be laid off at any time for almo
any reason. Only when mass layoffs or plant closures are involved are employers 
required to provide the adversely affected personnel with sixty days advance notice of 
such occurrences.9 
II.  LEGAL SOURCES 
 The sole legal right employees have to meaningfully influence their employm
conditions is available through union representation. Railroad and airline employees 
enjoy this right under the Railway Labor Act,10 while other private sector workers 
that right under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).11 Under both statutes, 
employees have the right to support unions, to organize, and to select representative 
unions for collective bargaining purposes. If a majority of employees in an appropr
 
 
5 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. 
 
6 See the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,  29 U.S.C §§ 621 et seq. (prohibiting discrimination 
against persons forty and older). 
 
7 See the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. 
 
8 See ROTHSTEIN, CRAVER, SCHROEDER & SHOBEN, supra note 3, at §§ 9.9-9.13. 
 
9 See the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq. 
 
10 45 U.S.C §§ 151 et seq. 
 
11 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. 
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bargaining unit designate a particular labor organization as their agent, that union 
becomes the exclusive bargaining agent for all of the employees in that unit, including 
individuals who oppose union representation. If no union obtains such majority support, 
 
 
Labor Board – that they enjoy the support of a majority of employees in specified 
nits. 
 
 
on 
demands, the workers may elect to strike, but a struck employer possesses the lawful 
                                                
it has no formal rights under U.S. labor law. 
 A non-majority union may not become the exclusive bargaining agent for a group 
of workers, but it may bargain for specified employees on a members-only basis – if any
employer agrees to such a voluntary arrangement.12 It is rare for employers to have any 
dealings with unions that have not established – either through authorization cards signed 
by a majority of employees in particular units or through secret ballot elections conducted
by the 
u
 If an exclusive bargaining agent is selected by a majority of employees in an 
appropriate unit, that entity has the right to negotiate with their employer with respect to
their wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. These negotiations 
may occur at the enterprise level, the plant level, or the shop level, depending upon the 
structure of the employing firm and the issues to be addressed. The employer is required 
to bargaining in good faith over such issues, but it is not obliged to make any concessions
or to agree to any particular union demands.13 If the employer refuses to give in to uni
 
12 Although Professor Charles Morris has cogently argued that even non-majority unions have the statutory 
right to demand bargaining on a members-only basis that would permit them to negotiate on behalf of 
actual union members without employer consent, it is doubtful the Labor Board or the U.S. Supreme Court 
would accept this interpretation of the NLRA. See CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT 
WORK (2005). 
 
13 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (defining the statutory duty to bargain). 
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right to hire temporary or permanent replacements for the striking workers.14 
Permanently replaced economic strikers only have to be place on a preferential recall list 
and be reemployed as future vacancies occur.15 
 Collective bargaining agreements generally define basic employment terms, and 
provide that employees may not be disciplined except for “just cause.” They also contain 
grievance-arbitration procedures which allow employees to file grievances challenging 
particular employer actions and allow unions to invoke binding arbitration procedures 
when they have been unable to resolve grievances through mutual discussions. The union 
either designates or a group of workers elect shop stewards who represent the employees 
at the shop level. Individuals who feel aggrieved by employer actions may file formal 
grievances and ask their shop stewards to process their claims. Although shop stewards – 
and other union officials – may obtain the information they need to administer the 
applicable bargaining agreement, they do not possess the right to see general firm 
financial or managerial information.16 
 Individual members of bargaining units have the statutory right to present 
personal grievances to their employer for possible resolution without going through their 
representative union – so long as the labor organization is notified about such discussions 
and given the opportunity to be present and no personal grievance adjustment is contrary 
                                                 
14 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. 
v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989). 
 
15 See Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 920 (1970). 
 
16 See NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967) (indicating that representative unions are entitled 
to the information they need to administer bargaining agreements). Compare NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing 
Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (employers not required to provide unions with confidential firm financial 
information unless they assert an inability to afford union demands during negotiations). 
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to the terms of the applicable bargaining agreement.17 Most bargaining unit members 
dissatisfied with employer actions challenge those actions through their representative 
union. They file a grievance with their shop steward who tries to achieve an appropriate 
resolution with the appropriate lower level supervisor. If no agreement is reached, higher 
level union and management officials try to reach an agreement. If no settlement is 
achieved, the union has the right to invoke binding arbitration conducted by an external 
neutral selected jointly by the disputing parties. 
 The Railway Labor Act was enacted in 1926 when most railroad workers were 
already represented by different trade unions. Most other private sector employees were 
not unionized at that time. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) had been formed in 
1886, consisting primarily of craft unions that represented different skilled trades. When 
the NLRA was passed in 1935, the U.S. was in a transition from an agricultural economy 
to an industrial economy. When it became clear that traditional AFL craft unions would 
find it difficult to organize the skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled persons working in 
manufacturing, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was formed and new 
industrial unions were created to organize the automobile, steel, rubber, and electrical 
manufacturing firms. By the mid-1950s, thirty-five percent of private sector workers 
were members of labor organizations.18 At the same time, the AFL and CIO combined to 
form the AFL-CIO, and competition between AFL craft unions and CIO industrial unions 
ceased. 
                                                 
17 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). 
 
18 See MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 
10, Table 1 (1987). See generally CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVICE? (1993). 
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 American labor organizations had successfully represented millions of workers 
for whom they enhanced their wages, fringe benefits, and general employment 
conditions. They created a true middle class for many blue collar employees. Although 
unionized companies tended to have greater productivity than nonunion firms, the wage 
premium generated by the bargaining process diminished the overall profits earned by 
organized corporations. The accommodation that had existed between labor and 
management during the 1950s and 1960s began to deteriorate due in part to the elevated 
inflation during the latter part of the 1970s which caused wages to rise substantially for 
unionized workers covered by cost-of-living-adjustment clauses which rose with 
increases in the consumer price index. Labor-management relations also declined in the 
latter part of the 1970s, after the business community worked successfully to defeat 
relatively modest labor law reform proposals that had been sought by union supporters. 
 By 1980, the percentage of private sector workers who were union members had 
declined to twenty-three percent. That decline was further exacerbated by globalization 
and the transfer of millions of production jobs to lower cost countries like Mexico and 
China, and the shift in the U.S. from a manufacturing economy to a white-collar, 
professional, and service economy – sections which unions found difficult to organize. 
By the end of 2010, only 6.9 percent of private sector employees were union members.19 
This means that the vast majority of employees no longer have a collective voice vis-a-
vis their corporate employers. 
                                                 
19 See Daily Labor Report (B.N.A.). No. 14 (Jan. 21, 2011), at AA-1. It is interesting to note that during the 
continued decline in private sector union membership, the percentage of public sector employees in labor 
organizations remained relatively constant at approximately thirty-six percent. This private-public sector 
disparity is partially due to the absence of a profit motive by governmental employers who do not work 
hard to discourage unionization by their workers. 
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 As labor organizations have declined, their absence has been filled by legislative 
regulations and expanded judicial involvement as workers have sought protection against 
the types of issues previously addressed in bargaining agreements and enforced through 
internal grievance-arbitration procedures. A brief review of some of the more significant 
legislative developments demonstrates the impact of proliferating legislative rules.  The 
Equal Pay Act of 196320 prohibits compensation differentials between male and female 
employees performing equal work. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196421 proscribes 
all employment discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196722 bans discrimination against 
individuals forty years of age or older. The Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment of 
197823 extends the Title VII prohibition against gender discrimination to distinctions 
based upon pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions. The Occupational 
Safety and health Act of 197024 requires employers to provide workers with safe 
employment environments, with Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
regulations setting standards which specify the exact conditions that must be provided, 
even if alternative measures might equally protect employee interests. The Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 197425 prescribes minimum vesting rules for private 
sector pension programs, establishes prudent investor obligations for pension funds, and 
                                                 
20 Pub. Law No. 88-38, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). 
 
21 Pub. Law No. 88-352, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. 
 
22 Pub. Law No. 90-202, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. 
 
23 Pub. Law No. 95-555, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 
24 Pub. Law No. 91-596, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. 
 
25 Pub. Law No. 93-406, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. 
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creates mandatory standards with respect to other fringe benefit programs. The Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 198826 requires sixty days advance notice 
of mass layoffs and plant closures, and the Drug Free Workplace Act of 198827 obliges 
employers to take steps to minimize illegal drug usage among employees. The Employee 
Polygraph Protection Act of 198828 outlaws the use of lie detectors by private employers 
except in narrowly prescribed circumstances. Title I of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 199029 prohibits employment discrimination against qualified individuals with 
mental or physical disabilities and obliges employers to provide reasonable 
accommodations for disabled persons if they can be furnished without undue hardship to 
employers. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 199330 mandates unpaid leave for 
workers affected by childbirth and family medical difficulties. 
 Judicial intervention over the past three decades has similarly restricted 
managerial freedom with respect to employee terminations. As courts encountered 
shocking cases of wrongful discharges, judges began to create exceptions to the 
traditional employment-at-will doctrine.31 Most state courts have recognized an 
exception that precludes the termination of workers based upon grounds that contravene 
important public policies. Courts have increasingly held employers liable for discharges 
that violate express or implied contractual limitations set forth in personnel policies or 
                                                 
26 Pub. Law No. 100-379, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq. 
 
27 Pub. Law No. 100-690, codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. 
 
28 Pub. Law No. 100-347, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§  2001 et seq. 
 
29 Pub. Law No. 101-336, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq. 
 
30 Pub. Law No. 103-3, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. 
 
31 see generally ROTHSTEIN, CRAVER, SCHROEDER & SHOBEN, supra note 3, at §§ 9.1-9.25. 
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employee performance review procedures.. A few state courts have even found implied 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing in individual employment contracts. Futur
judicial developments will likely erode employer freedom to a greater degree in this 
e 
e 
ation 
 if 
the 
ice 
 
 
                                                
critical area. 
 Professors Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers conducted a survey of over 2400 
persons and found that eighty-seven percent of U.S. workers would like some work plac
institution that would represent their interests.32 About half would like an organiz
strongly independent from their employer, with the other half leaning toward an 
institution that would be somewhat independent from management. The workers 
supporting such arrangements thought that employees would enjoy their jobs more
decisions regarding production and operations were made jointly by workers and 
management instead of by management alone, and they though that their firms would be 
more competitive if such employee-employer consultation systems existed.33 Many of 
respondents indicated that a major reason for their hesitancy to seek a collective vo
concerned fears of employer retribution if they did so. Although it is unlawful for 
employers to retaliate against employees because of their exercise of protected rights 
under the NLRA,34 it usually takes a year or two for illegally terminated individuals to
obtain reinstatement orders, and the only monetary cost to the responsible employers, 
beyond their own attorney fees, involves back pay for the persons who have been out of
work. By the time many illegally discharged employees obtain offers of reinstatement, 
 
32 See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 147, Exhibit 7.2 (1999). 
 
33 See id. at 42. 
 
34 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (prohibiting employer discrimination against employees who have exercised 
rights protected under the NLRA). 
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they have found positions with other firms and they decline the chance to return to the
former places of employment. Unions find it especially difficult to win Labor B
ir 
oard 
prese
 
 
 
half 
 
and 
 
e on these committees, and they generally determine the limited issues 
ul 
                                                
re ntation elections following the discharge of open employee organizers. 
 The ninety-two percent of private sector workers who do not have union 
representation have no legal right to participate in the operational management of their 
employers. They are employed on an at-will basis, and are subject to termination at any
time for almost any reason. If an informal group of employees were to get together to
discuss specific employment issues with their employer, they would be engaged in  
“concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection” within the meaning of  Section 7 of
the NLRA35 and be protected against retaliatory actions. On the other hand, if individual 
employees were to try to influence firm decisions affecting employment conditions, they 
would not be engaged in protected concerted conduct – unless they were acting on be
of other employees or were seeking to induce other workers to support their actions. 
 Although most nonunion U.S. employers wish to remain unorganized, many have
begun to appreciate the gains that may be achieved through limited worker participation 
programs. They have thus formed committees consisting of rank-and-file employees 
management personnel that are designed to focus on issues such as productivity and
service quality. Most of these employers participate directly in the selection of the 
employees to serv
to be addressed. 
 Although these firm-generated worker participation programs have become 
relatively common with respect to nonunion employers, many are technically unlawf
 
35 See 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
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under the NLRA. Section 2(5) expansively defines the term “labor organization” to 
include any “employee representation committee or plan, in which employees pa
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers 
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, o
conditions of work.”
rticipate 
r 
o dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of 
 If 
r 
he 
                                              
36 Section 8(a)(2) of the same statute makes it an unfair labor 
practice for an employer “t
any labor organization.”37 
 In a series of decisions, the Labor Board has technically limited the ability of 
nonunion employers to establish and maintain worker participation committees.38 The 
Board must initially determine whether the entity created by the employer constitutes a 
“labor organization” within the meaning of Section 2(5). A “labor organization” will be 
found if the participation committee in question consists in whole or in part of employees 
who act in a representational capacity by purporting to speak on behalf of other workers, 
and if it “deals with” the employer with respect to wages, hours, or working conditions.
the employer merely solicits input from such a committee and then decides on its own 
what to do, the committee would not be “dealing with” management.39 On the othe
hand, if managers and employee committee members discuss various proposals and t
employee members influence final firm decisions, the committee would be “dealing 
   
 See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), affirmed, 35 F.3d 1148 (7  Cir. 1994); Keeler Brass 
.B. 699 (2001). 
994). 
36 29 U.S.C. § 152(5). 
 
37 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). 
 
th38
Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995); Crown Cook & Seal Co., 334 N.L.R
 
39 See, e.g., NLRB v. Peninsula General Hospital, 36 F.3d 1262 (4th Cir. 1
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with” the employer.40 Since most of the worker participation committees that have been 
established by employers to speak for other employees and do “deal with” management 
with respect to employment conditions, they are legally “labor organizations” under the 
ns,” 
f 
d 
, unlawful domination of the administration of those 
ommi
d 
se 
t 
. 
NLRA. 
 If  worker participation committees are determined to be “labor organizatio
the Labor Board must then decide whether the employer unlawfully dominates or 
interferes with the formation or administration of those entities. If the employer selects 
the employee committee members or controls the nomination and election process for 
employee members, unlawful domination will be found with respect to the formation o
these groups. Even if the employer permits the employees to nominate and elect their 
own committee members, if the employer controls the agenda of committee meetings an
controls the topics to be discussed
c ttees is likely to be found. 
 Although some parties have challenged the legality of employer-establishe
worker participation committees, most committees have gone unchallenged. Few 
employees are aware of their NLRA rights, and employers are not required to apprise 
them of their rights under that statute. As a result, most employees participating in or 
affected by such worker participation programs do not realize that the operation of tho
entities may contravene the NLRA. In addition, where such committees have worked 
well and the employees feel satisfied with the way in which their employers have deal
with these institutions, the employees would be unlikely to challenge their existence
Many workers are pleased that such entities exist, and they wish these committees 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995). 
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possessed greater authority and could consider more than productivity and quality issue
Such committees are most likely to be challenged legally only when outside union
decide to organize the employees affected by them and they want to deprive th
employers of th
s. 
s 
e target 
e ability to use such worker participation programs as a means to 
 
, 
existing worker participation programs were functioning well and with few legal 
y right 
reate 
ul if committee 
                                                
convince the employees that they do not need representation by outside labor 
organizations. 
 In the late 1990s, employers sought the enactment of the Teamwork for 
Employees and Managers Act which would have provided companies with greater
freedom with respect to the operation of worker participation programs. Although the 
TEAM Act passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, it was vetoed by 
President Clinton.41 Despite the election of a more conservative President Bush in 2000
the business community did not work to get the TEAM Act through another congress. 
Their 
challenges, and it no longer seemed important to change the existing law regulating this 
area. 
 It is ironic in the U.S. that nonunion workers are provided with no statutor
to participate in firm operations at the plant level – and that employer efforts to c
meaningful worker participation programs are likely to be unlawf
members act in a representative capacity and “deal with” their employer in any 
significant manner with respect to wages or working conditions. 
III. FEATURES OF  EMPLOYER-ESTABLISHED WORKER COMMITTEES  
 
41 See Daily Labor Report (B.N.A.) No. 147 (July 31, 1996) at AA-1. 
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 Even though the U.S. has no rules requiring worker participation at the plant level 
and even though the establishment of employee representation committees by employer
is likely to contravene the NLRA due to the extensive control firms exercise over their 
creation and administration, thousands of businesses have created such committees.
rarely do so to advance worker interests, but rather to enhance firm profitability. Some 
are limited to health and safety issues to minimize firm liability under state and federal
occupational safety and health 
s 
 They 
 
laws. Most, however, are used primarily to enhance 
 individual 
rd 
ff 
ll of the increased earnings for managers and 
er 
er important to firm success. Nonetheless, some firms take 
                                                
worker productivity and product or service quality. Employers appreciate the fact that 
employees often know how to make their jobs more efficient and how to improve the 
quality of what they produce.  
 Some employers try to avoid layoffs that might be generated by greater
productivity, and they even discuss gain-sharing with the employee committees to rewa
workers for their increased outputs. Nonetheless, other firms do not hesitate to lay o
redundant personnel and retain a
shareholders.42 It is experiences like those emanating from these latter companies that 
make employees skeptical about the benefits they are likely to derive from worker 
participation committee efforts. 
 Most of these committees consist of rank-and-file employees and management 
personnel. In some cases, the employer selects the individuals to serve, while in others 
the workers are allowed to select their own representatives. The agendas of work
participation committees are generally determined by employer officials. They tend to 
focus on the issues they consid
 
42 See Charles B. Craver, The American Worker: Junior Partner in Success and Senior Partner in Failure, 
37 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW 587 (2003). 
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a  expansive approach and permit such issues as employee discipline to be 
considered. Some allow employee representatives to bring up issues they think workers 
would like to have discussed. 
 More expansive worker participation committee agendas can have benefic
results for both employees and employers. Rank-and-file workers usually know their jobs 
well, and th
 more
ial 
ey are able, if asked, to suggest ways to improve productivity and quality. So 
e firm 
rofita
d 
nificant 
ing 
ar, professional, and service firms in retail, finance, health care, 
ice at 
ion 
                                                
long as they do not fear job losses due to their good faith efforts to enhanc
p bility, they are likely to participate meaningfully and feel appreciated by corporate 
managers. 
IV. POSSIBILITY OF MANDATED WORKER PARTICIPATION  
 Unless the American labor movement is able to drastically reverse the downwar
trend which has existed over the past fifty years, it is unlikely that we will see sig
union growth in the coming years. The heavily organized production industries are be
replaced by white-coll
insurance, and similar areas. Even inventive unions like the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU) find  it difficult to generate support among employees at 
firms like Wal-Mart. 
 If the eighty-seven percent of employees who wish to have a collective vo
work are to be heard, some form of statutorily prescribed plant level program will be 
necessary. European nations – both under individual statutes and European Un
directives – provide far more expansive shop level worker participation.43 Either 
employers must be required to establish works council type institutions, or employees 
 
43 See generally JOEL ROGERS & WOLFGANG STREECK, eds., WORKS COUNCILS (1995). 
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must be authorized to request the creation of such entities. Firms with worker 
participation committees would be obliged to provide such institutions with firm 
information regarding firm operations and contemplated managerial changes that would
significantly affect employee interests. At a minimum, firms should have to
 
 consult with 
mploy  
es 
nd 
nt 
nhance firm operations to the benefit of both shareholders and 
ve to 
, or two 
 a 
                                                
e ee participation committees before they implement such changes, and, in some
cases, more significant steps could be required under codetermination-like procedur
that would allow such committees to block proposed management actions. 
 The U.S. is not currently ready for such expansive worker participation either 
economically or politically. American business leaders believe that the creation of 
European style worker participation programs would greatly diminish productivity a
efficiency. Due to the history of adversarial labor-management relations, managers fear 
that some employee representatives on participation committees would view manageme
as the enemy. These representatives would be suspicious of firm proposals that are 
reasonably calculated to e
workers. Managers are also concerned about the fact that rank-and-file employees who 
have absolutely no managerial experience will not appreciate why certain operational 
decisions must be made. 
 If meaningful shop level worker participation is to occur, Congress would ha
enact a statute requiring all firms with a minimum number of fifty, one hundred
hundred employees to create worker participation committees.44 For smaller firms with
single location, one committee would be sufficient. For larger firms, with different 
 
44 See Charles B. Craver, Mandatory Worker Participation is Required in a Declining Union Environment 
to Provide Employees with Meaningful Industrial Democracy, 66 GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW 
REVIEW 135 (1997). See also Stephen Befort, A New Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal for an 
American Works Councils Act, 69 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW 607 (2004). 
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divisions at the same location, separate committees might be required for each 
department. Where multi-plant operations are involved, at least one worker committ
would be required for each facility tha
ee 
t had more than a specified minimum number of 
mploy
s, 
s could be 
pose s. If 
ight 
ave 
nfair 
                                                
e ees. Larger corporations could be required to establish enterprise level 
participation committees that would have to be consulted when issues of firm-wide 
significance are being contemplated. 
 The law could require that two-thirds or three-quarters of committee members be 
elected by rank-and-file employees, with the other one-third or one-quarter being elected 
by lower level management personnel who often think that their voices are not being 
heard by higher management officials. Committee members could serve four year term
with half being elected every two years to provide some continuity. Term limit
im d to insure that the same individuals would not serve for prolonged period
enterprise level participation committees were established, the members of such firm-
wide committees could be elected by local worker participation committees.45 
 Although employers have generally opposed legislation that would grant 
employees the right to participate directly in managerial decisions, two factors m
ultimately persuade them that such programs would not necessarily have negative 
consequences. First, if unions use the Internet to reach employees whose employers h
established internal worker participation programs designed merely to improve 
productivity and quality, with minimal benefit to the affected employees, more u
 
45 Rank-and-file employees and lower level managerial personnel could also be allowed to elect several 
corporate board members to allow them to express worker interests at board meetings, with all board 
members having dual fiduciary obligations to both workers and shareholders. Where shareholder and 
worker interests conflict, board members could be immune from liability so long as they make good faith 
decisions that reasonably consider shareholder and employee interests. 
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labor practice cases will be prosecuted before the Labor Board at substantial cost to 
firms. Second, if most businesses remain unorganized when eighty-seven percent of 
workers wish to have some collective voice, more employees may contemplate 
aw 
at 
ld be economically inefficient. The 
s and 
rams may be called “quality circles,” “production 
ams,”
uality, 
unionization and many will seek greater legislative involvement at the federal and state 
levels designed to further restrict managerial freedom. In addition, more wrongful l
suits will be filed which will cost employers millions of dollars. 
 Employer representatives regularly complain about the increasing legislative and 
judicial regulation of employment relationships. They assert that the inappropriate 
behavior of a few aberrant companies has generated restrictive federal and state rules that 
unreasonably limit the managerial freedom of mainstream firms. They also maintain th
rational employers do not overtly discriminate or make personnel decisions based upon 
improper considerations, noting that such conduct wou
cost of replacing skilled employees who possess firm-specific training is so high that 
corporate leaders would not unnecessarily sever beneficial employment relationship
risk placing their firms at a competitive disadvantage. 
 American business officials maintain that human capital is their most important 
resource, and they claim they treat their workers fairly and generously. To enhance 
employer-employee relations, many companies have created shop level employee 
participation committees. These prog
te  or “quality of work life programs.” These arrangements are designed to facilitate 
communication between managers and employees, to improve product or service q
and to increase worker productivity. 
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 When the legal status of many firm-established worker participation programs ha
been challenged, the Labor Board has held that such instituti
s 
ons constitute “labor 
d 
icipation programs to 
tivity and 
te employee insecurity.47 
Employees reasonably fear that suggested productivity enhancements will be rewarded – 
not by greater firm appreciation, but by layoffs caused by the need for fewer workers.48 
organizations” that are unlawfully dominated by the employers that established them an
that control their operations. To counteract these Board decisions, corporate leaders 
sought the enactment of the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act which would 
have provided companies with greater freedom in this area. 
 Business leaders believe that companies need worker part
increase worker-management communication and to enhance employee produc
output quality. They recognize that firms in countries like Germany and Japan have used 
employee involvement committees to improve their competitive positions in global 
markets, and would like to achieve similar benefits in the U.S.46 
 Corporate executives frequently complain about the lack of employee 
commitment to firm objectives. They cannot understand why their workers do not share 
their institutional enthusiasm. They ignore the fact that they have specifically told new 
employees that their positions can be terminated at any time for any reason. They fail to 
appreciate the fact that these employment-at-will relationships and lack of worker 
involvement in the managerial decision-making process genera
                                                 
46 See Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate 
 See LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD 137-140 (1992). 
RS LAW REWIEW 513, 575-579 (1993) (discussing the treatment of labor in the U.S.). 
Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 899, 936-940 (1993). 
 
47
 
48 See Aleta G.Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for the Long Term, 45 
RUTGE
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E ees also believe that quality improvements will increase shareholder equit
managerial bonuses, but not be shared with regular workers.49 
 If corporate officials wish to improve employee morale, avoid the further 
proliferating of intrusive federal and state intervention, and retain greater localized 
control over their terms and conditions of employment, they should appreciate the 
potential benefits to be derived from truly reciprocal worker participation programs.  
Such programs would provide employees with a greater appreciation for the competitive 
pressures affecting their employers, and business firms would obtain valuable input from
their knowledgeable workers. Federal legislation could authorize employee involvement 
committees to oversee the enforcement of safety and health regulations, wage and ho
laws, civil rights enactments, and other similar employment legislation. When warranted,
such committees could grant employers waivers from unnecessary federal and state 
regulations, so long as these waivers did not compromise underlying wor
mploy y and 
 
ur 
 
ker interests. If 
rograms 
rs 
 
they were to function efficiently, cooperative employer-employee involvement p
could replace traditionally adversarial labor-management relationships. 
 It is time to acknowledge that corporate success is dependent upon three 
symbiotic groups: (1) the investors who provide the necessary capital; (2) the mange
who provide the requisite leadership; and (3) the employees who perform the basic job
functions. Corporate laws protect the rights of business investors. Federal and state 
securities laws entitle prospective shareholders to receive extensive firm information 
before they decide whether to purchase shares of stock. Shareholders receive extensive 
                                                 
49 See Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a 
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 1189, 1210 
(1991). 
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information regarding firm operations, and they directly participate in the election of 
corporate directors. Firm managers owe shareholders a fiduciary duty and are liable to 
 
, 
ey 
 
r working lives to the success 
required to provide them with significant career mobility. 
stockholders who are injured by breaches of this duty. In addition, because capital is a 
highly mobile commodity, shareholders can protect their interests through diversification
and by transferring their financial support from poorly performing businesses to other 
investments. 
 Corporate managers possess the capacity to protect themselves against business 
vicissitudes. They enjoy access to confidential information regarding firm performance
and they exercise meaningful discretion over decisions that affect their own futures. Th
can usually avoid the insecurity associated with employment-at-will arrangements 
through individual employment contracts that guarantee their continued employment for 
specified terms. They may be able to obtain generous severance packages if they lose 
their positions through corporate reorganizations or buyouts. They often benefit from
bonus payments and stock options that are unavailable to most subordinate personnel. 
 Rank-and-file employees are generally treated no better than the equipment they 
use or operate.50 Even though such employees commit thei
of their respective firms, they enjoy no employment security. They are not privy to 
confidential firm information, nor are they usually consulted about business decisions 
that may directly affect their employment destinies. Most lack the unique personal skills 
                                                 
50 See CHARLES A. REICH, OPPOSING THE SYSTEM 22 (1995). 
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 American employees are feeling increasingly isolated and underappreci
Most would like the opportunity to be part of larger employment communities in which 
they could openly share their ideas and concerns with their colleagues.
ated.51 
be 
m their job tasks even if 
not closely monitoring them. Their objectives can only be 
are 
 
 to 
 7.5 
d state legislatures have filled 
l 
52 They want to 
respected for their knowledge and be trusted to perfor
management officials are 
achieved if Congress enacts legislation that requires larger employers to provide their 
employees with meaningful shop level participation. 
V. SUMMARY 
 The U.S. has no formal rules requiring worker participation at the shop level. 
Where employees have selected labor organizations as their bargaining agents, they 
able through such unions to influence their wages, hours, and working conditions both at 
the enterprise level and the shop level. Such bargaining relationships were quite common 
throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when twenty-five to thirty-five percent of 
private sector workers were union members. As a result of globalization, transition from
an industrial to a white-collar and service economy, and increased employer opposition
labor organizations, the percentage of private sector workers in unions has declined to
percent. As this downward trend has occurred, federal an
the void with the enactment of many statutes restricting managerial freedom. Judicia
decisions have eroded the traditional employment-at-will rule allowing employers to 
terminate employees at any time for almost any reason. 
                                                 
51 See Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, 1993 BRIGHAM YOUNG 
Capital, 6 JOURNAL OF D
 
UNIVERSTIY LAW REVIEW 727 (1993); Robert D.Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social 
EMOCRACY 65, 68-69 (1995). 
52 See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WORKER REPRESENTATION AND 
PARTICIPATION SURVEY: REPORT OF THE FINDINGS 14-17 (Princeton University Associates 
1994). 
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 and 
-two percent of U.S. workers with no union representation hope to 
btain plant level participation, Congress will have to enact a law mandating employee 
participation committees. If these committees could generate cooperative worker-
management relationships, they could diminish legislative involvement in employment, 
and even provide employers with a way to oversee the enforcement of many existing 
employment laws. 
 
 A number of employers have established their own employee committees – 
primarily to enhance product or service quality and to improve productivity. Many of 
these institutions constitute “labor organizations” within the meaning of the NLRA
are actually unlawful if the employers control the selection of employee members or the 
issues to be addressed. 
 If the ninety
o
